The latest technology in electronic voting systems is assumed to count votes rapidly and accurately. This is usually true, but even the most advanced technology designed to meet current voting requirements may not count votes satisfactorily when new or unusual conditions for voting are imposed.

Legislators advocating changes in the election system must also consider the technological and administrative implications of those changes, differential impacts depending upon the method of voting, and the difficulties those changes may pose for the voter. There are many ways to tally votes and to determine winners, as demonstrated from recent elections in Dallas County, Texas and Illinois.

Texas

The Texas Democratic Party recently complained in federal court that touch screen ballots reflected the intent of straight ticket voters differently than paper ballots used by absentee voters in the same election. The party won a court order requiring Dallas County to pre-clear the electronic voting system under Sec. 5 of the Voting Rights Act to ensure it did not discriminate against minorities. Dallas County had twice previously been granted preclearance for the electronic voting method but had not referenced the difference between paper and electronic voting in their submission.
  
With the electronic voting machine, a voter who selected the straight party option and then selected an individual candidate of the same party ended up cancelling the vote for that candidate. On the absentee or paper ballot containing a vote for a straight-party ticket, an additional vote for an individual candidate of the same party resulted in the individual vote being ignored. This mark was generally considered to be an emphasis of the vote – not an additional vote.

This became a contentious issue during a recount in November 2008 when a state representative race was decided by only 19 votes. In March 2010, the Justice department declined to issue an objection because the voting machine highlighted all candidates of the party receiving a straight ticket vote and in bold red letters warned voters that no selection was made on straight party-ballots where a single candidate had been “deselected.”

Illinois

A more complicated issue arose in the February 2010 statewide primary in Illinois when for the first time the law required that voters who undervoted by failing to vote in races for any statewide constitutional office be given an opportunity “to complete their ballot.”  This resulted in a statewide election that was administered differently, not only between votes cast in person and absentee by mail, but also one in which voter options were different depending upon how each county’s state attorney interpreted the law.

Most Illinois counties use an optical scan ballot that is read by a card reader at the precinct. The law required the voting card reader to reject the ballot if the ballot contains no vote for any state constitutional offices – Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State, Comptroller or Treasurer. The law directs the poll official to advise the voter that no vote was cast for one or more of these offices. The voter could then choose to take the ballot back and make additional choices, or simply allow the ballot to be deposited again and be counted as indicated. Voters who voted absentee by paper ballot had no reminder to vote for candidates for these offices.

Not all counties, however, followed the undercount law. One of the two voting systems most commonly used in the state required software modifications to be able to manage the undervote and not all counties made these modifications. Some county election officials announced prior to the election that even if they were able to warn of undervotes, they would not do so because this was a violation of the secret ballot provision of the election code.

They said secrecy was violated in two ways. Any voter whose ballot was rejected would be exposed to precinct officials and poll watchers as someone who had not voted for at least one of several offices. Depending on how the rejected ballot was physically handled by the poll worker and voter, it might be visible to persons in the polling place. More importantly, observers would know that any ballot not rejected by the card reader would have contained a vote for the uncontested candidates for constitutional office on the ballot.

Some county clerks for reasons related to technology – complexity of software modifications, greater protection of voter secrecy or other effects – allowed the voting system to reject all ballots that contained an undervote for any office. As a result there were county clerks who were unopposed on the ballot and who knew for certain that specific voters whose ballots were not rejected had voted for them.

Voters using electronic touch screens who failed to make a choice in any of the constitutional races were informed on the screen of the undervote and had an opportunity to vote for the office if they wished to do so. This action could not be detected by election officials or poll watchers. The Illinois undercount law is unique and is being challenged as a violation of the state constitution.

Other Ways To Count The Votes

Advocates of the single transferrable vote, also called instant runoff voting (IRV), have long complained their preferred method of voting has been rebuffed in various jurisdictions because the election technology in use in the jurisdiction could not accommodate the transfer of votes required without major revisions. With IRV, voters rank their preferences 1,2,3,4, etc. If no candidate has a majority of first preferences, the candidate with the fewest first preference votes is eliminated and the votes on those ballots are transferred to the second choice indicated. The process continues until one candidate obtains a majority or no transfers remain.

Election Administration Reports
Contact:
Richard G. Smolka, Editor
eareditor@aol.com